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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CENSORSHIP-FREEDOM To
ADVOCATE IDEAS.

Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the
State of New York (U.S. 1959)
A license for exhibition was denied the film "Lady Chatterly's Lover,"
on the basis that it was immoral under a New York statute empowering
a board of censors to examine every film prior to exhibition and to refuse
to license any film found to be "immoral or of such a character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime." 1 Upon review,
the Regents of the State of New York upheld the denial of the license,
but on the broader ground that "the whole theme of this picture is immoral under said law, for that theme is the presentation of adultery as a
desirable, acceptable, and proper pattern of behavior." 2 The appellate
division annulled this determination, 3 but on appeal the court of appeals
overruled the decision of the lower court.4 The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed and held that the statute was an unconstitutional
interference with the freedom to advocate ideas guaranteed by the first
amendment, and thus was an infringement of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
Univ. of the State of New York, 79 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1959). 5
In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com'n. of Ohio6 the Supreme
Court of the United States was for the first time presented with the contention that a state statute requiring prior approval of motion picture
film was an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech and press. The
Court rejected this proposition and held that the guarantees of freedom
of speech and press were not extended to motion pictures because the
exhibition of them was a business conducted only for profit. A more
liberal view in the area of first amendment rights began in 1925 when
1. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 122.

2. Id., § 122-a.
3. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New
York, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1957).
4. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New
York, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958).
5. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New
York, 79 Sup. Ct. 1362 (1957).
6. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
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the Court in Gitlow v. New York 7 decided that the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and press are safeguarded against state
action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 "Big
business" came within the doctrine of the Gitlow case when the Supreme
Court held in Thomas v. Collins9 that profit making publications were
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. The first indication
that a motion picture would be considered as a profit-making publication
within the ambit of protection afforded by the guarantee of freedom
of speech and press came in United States v. Paramount Pictures.10
Finally, in 1952, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide specifically
whether the first and fourteenth amendment guarantees applied to motion
pictures, and it held in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson," that a state may
not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrilegious,"
because by the use of such a vague standard there is an unconstitutional
infringement upon freedom of speech and press. However, the Burstyn
decision cannot be construed as giving motion pictures absolute protection
from infringement upon the guarantees of freedom of speech and press,
as limitations on them in other areas have always been upheld. 1 2 The
limitations on freedom of speech and press, which are not within the
bounds of constitutional protection, extend to the lewd, obscene, profane,
libelous, and words which by their nature injure or incite to an immediate
breach of the peace."3
The problem before the Court in the instant case is determining
whether a film advocating sexual immorality as a proper pattern of behavior in certain circumstances comes within those limitations which a
state may constitutionally impose upon freedom of speech and press. As
a result of prior Supreme Court decisions the expression of ideas can only
be validly prohibited if it is found that they create a clear and present
danger of producing a serious substantive evil ;14 but the remoteness of
proving such a contention in the instant case was so great that it was not
made by the Board of Regents. Thus the statute in question is a limitation preventing the advocacy of an idea which is contrary to the prevailing
7. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8. Id. at 666. The Court said: "...
we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States." This decision has been subsequently affirmed. Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
10. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). The Court said: "We have no doubt that moving
pictures, like newspapers and radios, are included in the press whose freedom is
guaranteed by the First Amendment."
11. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
12. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ; Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466 (1920).
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
14. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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moral code of the community. Such expression is, nevertheless, protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments, as it is clear that the advocacy
of conduct proscribed by law is not a sufficient justification for denying
free speech.", While the decision in this case certainly solves a bothersome
problem, its limited scope still leaves the area in an indecisive state. The
contention that all prior restraints on motion pictures are unconstitutional
still must be answered, since the majority gave no indication as to whether
they are bad on their face, or whether their unconstitutionality would depend on the subject matter and the extent of the limitation.' 6 Even admitting the validity of censorship statutes, it still must be determined
whether there are present in motion pictures certain characteristics which
will permit a state to impose stricter regulations or whether they are to
be guided solely by the constitutional safeguards which have been maintained for newspapers, books, and individual speech. Since the Court has
traditionally based its decisions on the narrowest grounds possible, the
answers to the questions remaining can only be determined when the
proper factual elements arise. However, the Burstyn case and the present
one are strong indications that the Court will adopt for motion pictures the
same complete set of freedoms and limitations applicable to other publications protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Harry J. Oxman

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-UNLAWFUL

INSPECTION WITHOUT WARRANT

SEARcH-HEALTHI

NOT VIOLATION

OF DUE PROCESS.

Frank v. Maryland (U.S. 1959)
Upon receiving a complaint by a neighbor of the presence of rats in
the vicinity of appellant's house, a representative of the City Health
Department began an inspection of the area. He found the exterior of
appellant's house in an extreme state of decay, and in the rear of the
property stood a half-ton pile of straw, trash, and debris mixed with
rodent feces. Though not in possession of a warrant, the inspector requested permission to conduct a further inspection of the house and appellant refused. The inspector left, returning the next day accompanied
by two police officers, again without a warrant. His knock this time
met with no reply. Shortly thereafter, appellant was arrested and fined
15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
16. Justices Black and Douglas, in separate concurring opinions reaffirmed their
previous stands that all such prior censorship is unconstitutional. Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 79 Sup. Ct. at
1366 and at 1370.
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twenty dollars for violating Section 120 of Article 12 of the Baltimore
City Code' which provides that the occupant of any house wherein the
Commissioner of Health has cause to suspect a nuisaice exists shall forfeit twenty dollars for every refusal to open the house for inspection. On
appeal, the Criminal Court of Baltimore, in a de novo proceeding, also
found appellant guilty. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari
and, on appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held, with four
Justices dissenting, that appellant's conviction for resisting inspection of
his house without a warrant was not obtained without due process of law
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup.
Ct. 804 (1959).2

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures has long been
recognized as a basic liberty,3 guaranteed by the fourth amendment 4 and
protected from state interference 5 by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6 Although it is settled law that arbitrary intrusions
to procure evidence for use against a suspect in a criminal proceeding
are unreasonable and violate due process, 7 there is little case law as to
the constitutionality of health inspections of private homes without a
warrant. A Maryland case, Givner v. State,8 held that while a state may
not affirmatively authorize an unreasonable search and seizure, an attempted
inspection by a health inspector is a valid exercise of the police power,
and not an unreasonable search. Likewise the Supreme Court of Ohio,
citing the Givner case, decided that the inviolability of a homeowner's
"castle" is subordinate to the general health and welfare of the community. 9
This problem of health inspections was considered by the United States
Court of Appeals in 1950 in District of Columbia v. Little, 10 and the
majority, with a strong dissenting opinion, held that "health officials without a warrant cannot invade a private home to inspect it to see that it is
clean and wholesome .... ." 11 On certiorari to the Supreme Court howL.

BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 12, § 120 (1950).
2. Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. 804 (1959).
3. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
4. U. S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . ."
5. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "...
nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ....
6. "The knock at the door, whether by day or night, as a prelude to a search,
without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need
the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception
of human rights . . . [and] we have no hesitation in saying that were a state affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
7. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 455 (1948); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8. 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956). The state court upheld the same ordinance
questioned in the principal case. Similar ordinances have been in effect in Baltimore
since 1801. See Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. at 810.
9. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
10. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
11. Id. at 20.
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ever, the Court was content to affirm the decision of the lower court on
12
the facts, and not discuss the constitutional question of unlawful search.
The instant case, therefore, is the first time the Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of an ordinance authorizing a health inspection without a warrant. In upholding this ordinance, the majority relied
on the fact that the ordinance was not an infringement upon the right
to be secure from unauthorized intrusions to obtain evidence, 13 but only
14
"the slightest restriction" on the right to personal privacy.
The dissenting Justices sound a warning that the instant decision is
a dangerous inroad into the age-old liberty characterized by the apothegm
"a man's home is his castle." 15 The majority however, does not deny
this basic liberty of personal privacy, but decides that the invasion here
is not an unreasonable one. The Court would seem to agree with the dissenting judge in the Little case, that this right and the other personal
liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and unqualified, 16
and when balanced against the benefits accruing to the general health and
safety of the public, this invasion of the privacy of a single citizen touches
only on "the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment." 17 Although the dissent would say that any search
without a warrant is unreasonable, except in cases of emergency, the
majority asserts that these inspections are of such importance that expediting them in this manner is a great advantage to the community.
Search warrants are issued in the furtherance of criminal proceedings,
usually allowing for the seizure of personal property for use as evidence
therein,' and it is questionable whether a health inspector could even
obtain a warrant for a mere inspection of conditions.' 9 In addition, the
insignificant number of refusals by individuals to allow inspections20 would
make it appear that such warrants are not deemed necessary by the general public, and would serve only to hinder the administration of public
12. District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). The Court decided that
the mere failure of the defendant to unlock her door was not an "interference" which
was prohibited by the District of Columbia regulation in question, and did not discuss
the question of invasion of privacy.
13. Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. at 808. ".. . [I]t was on the issue of the
right to be secure from searches and seizures for evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was
fought." See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14. Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. at 809. The majority urges that this is
only a slight restriction based on the qualifications placed on the inspection by the,
ordinance - that there be valid grounds for inspection, that it be made in the day
time, that a request be made of the homeowner, and that there be no forceful entry.
15. William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, protested the invasion of the home most
eloquently: "The wind may enter, the rain may enter, but the King of England
may not enter. All his forces may not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement"
(quoted by Charles Abrams in the NATIONAL HOUSING CONFERENCE, HOUSING
YtARBOOK OF 1956, 17).
16. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d at 24.
17. Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. at 809.
18. Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1930) ; People
v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794 (1913).
19. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d at 23.
20. Frank v. Maryland, 79 Sup. Ct. at 812.
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health programs. Moreover, requiring the same quantum of probable cause
for issuance of a health inspection warrant as is necessary in criminal
proceedings would place a stumbling block in the path of an efficient
health plan, while a "synthetic warrant" 21 issued for little or no cause
argues for the elimination of a warrant requirement completely. In any
event, on the facts of the instant case, the seach does not seem unreasonable, and the Court has left open to itself a method of retreat, in that on
other facts, it may find the invasion unreasonable and invalid.
Thomas J. Ward

CORPORATIONS-INSIDER
UNDER

PROFITS-LIABILITY

SECTION 16(B)

OF A DIRECTOR

OF THE SECURITIES

EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934.

Adler v. Klawans (2d Cir. 1959)
This action was brought under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 by a stockholder on behalf of his corporation to recover profits made by appellant, a director of the corporation, on the
sale of its stock within six months after purchase. Despite the fact that
appellant had not been a director at the time this stock was purchased,
the district court rendered summary judgment for the stockholder in the
amount of the profits realized. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed and held that section 16(b) applied even to an
individual who was not a director at the time of both the purchase and
sale of the stock, provided he held the position of director at the time
21. Ibid. "Dispensing with rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue," and
providing for a "loose basis for granting a search warrant," would make such a
warrant in effect a synthetic one, according to Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
1. 48 STAT. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1951). The applicable provisions
of this section are:
"For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. . . . This subsection shall
not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of
the security involved, or any transaction which the Commission by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."
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of either purchase or sale. In the computation of profits, however, the
court refused to consider as profits dividends paid on shares which were
subsequently sold at a loss since the loss exceeded the amount of the
2
dividends. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
Section 16(b) was designed to eliminate the profitable use of confidential information by corporate directors, officers, and ten percent beneficial owners, commonly called "insiders", in short-term (i.e., six month)
trading in securities of their own corporation.3 As a remedial provision,
the section must not be strictly construed but must be interpreted as
consistently with its legislative purpose as is possible. 4 This was accomplished in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.5 by the adoption of an objective
standard whereby mere proof of a sale and purchase within six months is
conclusive against the defendant. This eliminates the opportunity for any
insider to impose such defenses as non-user of confidential information
or intent to aid the corporation by stabilizing the price of its securities. 6
The Smolowe case also introduced a rule of profit computation designed
to "squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions" 7 by requiring that
the highest selling price within the six month period be matched against
the lowest purchase price therein, and the next highest selling price against
the next lowest purchase price, and so on, with no deduction for losses. s
The above holdings in the Smolowe case were complemented by the decision in Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte9 which defined a purchase to
include an executory contract to purchase as well as an executed purchase, and thus prevented a scheme of buying now for delivery after the
expiration of the six month period as a means of avoiding the effect of
the statute. 10 The Park & Tilford case also decided that preferred stock
convertible into common did not fall within the exemption for securities
2. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
3. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172
F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943) ;
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953) ; Truncale
v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see Loss, SECURIMs ReGULATrION
561 (1951) ; Report of Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange
Practices, S. RmP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934) ; Cook and Feldman,
Insider Trading Under The Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. Rgv. 385 (1953) ;
Rubin and Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use Of Corporate Information By Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. Rgv. 468 (1947).
4 Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 337 (1940).
5. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
6. Id. at 236, note 5.
7. 136 F.2d at 239.
8. In determining the profits the court rejected the first in - first out method
(the security which is sold is presumed to be the first purchased within the period)
and the average cost method (the average purchase price during the period is compared to the average selling price therein to determine profit) as inconsistent with
the purpose of the section. This rule was reaffirmed after independent analysis by
Judge Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951), and was
applied to the purchase and sale of stock options in Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F.
Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
9. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947).
10. Id. at 987.
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acquired in good faith in connection with a previously contracted debt.11
This restrictive interpretation of exemptions to the act was followed in
Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors Corp.12 which held that a person will be
considered a ten percent beneficial owner at the time of purchase even
if this purchase increased his ownership to ten percent, thus in effect
denying to him the benefit of the exemption for ten percent beneficial
owners who are not such both at the time of purchase and sale. 13 Other
cases under the statute have also emphasized its remedial nature by holding that the corporation cannot waive its rights under section 16(b) ;14
that it is immaterial if the corporation is benefited by the sale, 15 and that
a rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission which conflicts with
the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is invalid.'"
The holding of the instant case that the director need not be such
both at the time of the purchase and sale to be included within the provisions of section 16(b) is the first decision on that point in the circuit
courts. 17

This holding is important because it closes up what was a pos-

sible loophole' 8 in the statute, and also because it points tip the fact that
the courts are still construing the act so as to effectuate its remedial purpose. This consistent policy of the courts also tends to further the purpose of the act by discouraging insiders from engaging in practices which
if questionable, will probably be comprehended as abuses within the act.
It should be noted, however, that in computing the profits in this case
the court did not consider as profits dividends on stock subsequently sold
at a loss in excess of the amount of the dividends, but hled that dividends
on a share of stock cannot be considered as a profit apart from the purchase and sale price of that share. 19 Therefore, it seems that for the purpose of determining the profit on the sale of any one share of stock all
monetary benefits which the owner has received as a result of his ownership of such stock must be evaluated along with the difference between
11. See note 1 supra. Convertible stock is either preferred or common stock
which can be traded in for stock of the other class at the owner's option. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 512 (2d Ed. 1946). The way in which convertible stock is
used to secure profits can be best illustrated by an example. A owns 100 shares of
preferred stock (market price $10 per share), and each share is convertible into
two shares of common stock. If common stock is worth $5.50 per share on the
market and A exercises his option, he makes a profit of $100 and he still owns 200
shares of common stock of the company. There may, of course, be a conversion
price and no trade will then be necessary.
12. 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956).
13. See note 1 supra.
14. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1953).
15. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1956).
16. Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But see Continental Oil Co. v. Perlitz, 176 F. Supp. 219 (D.C. S. Tex. 1959).
17. 267 F.2d at 842. Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) decided
the question in the same way in the district court. For an interesting prediction
of the decision see Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 3 at 578.
18. If the case were decided the other way, prospective directors who have
confidential information could buy stock of the corporation prior to their formal
installation as directors and sell it at will.
19. 267 F.2d at 849.
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the purchase and sale price of the stock.2 0 Even though the court did
not expressly decide the problems of whether dividends are profits when
such dividends exceed the subsequent loss on the sale of the stock or
when the dividends are accompanied by a profit on the sale of the stock,
it did provide a means whereby these situations can be resolved when
they arise.

2

1

George R. Kucik

CRIMINAL

LAW-INSANITY

AS

A DEFENSE-TESTS

FOR

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

State v. Lucas (N.J. 1959)
Defendant was convicted of felony murder on evidence from which
the jury found he set fire to a church rectory resulting in the death of
three persons. On appeal, the defendant urged that the M'Naghten rule
not be continued as the test for insanity in New Jersey. Although the
state argued that the issue was not properly raised, the court chose to
by-pass the state's argument and decide the issue on its merits. The court
affirmed the conviction, holding that the M'Naghten rule will continue to
be the test for criminal responsibility in New Jersey, until the court should
be firmly convinced by scientific fact that a test other than the M'Naghten
one would serve the basic end of the state's criminal jurisprudence. State
v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50 (N.J. 1959).'
The classic test of criminal responsibility adhered to by a majority
of the common law jurisdictions derives from the rule in M'Naghten's
Case.2 In an advisory opinion following the decision in that case the
judges set forth what has since popularly come to be known as the "right
and wrong" test,3 which from its inception has been subject to criticism
20. Ibid. This is not to be confused with the rule in the Smolowe case that
the profit on the sale of one share of stock cannot be offset by a loss on the sale
of another share, because the situation dealt with here only concerns a method of
determining the profit on the sale of one share of stock where dividends have been
received.
21. "Situations may well arise relative to dividends where they are so inextricably
connected with the 'purchase and sale' of stock and possible manipulation by insiders
for their own benefit and to the detriment of the corporation and the investing public
as to compel the formulation of a rule on the subject under discussion in order to

prevent the frustration of the statutory purpose.
at 849.

Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d

1. State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50 (N.J. 1959).
2. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1848).
3. The test is that the accused must be "labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing: or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong".
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 202, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1848).
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and to attempts at revision. 4 In spite of its stormy history the rule has
been constantly reaffirmed, 5 and thus far, no other rule for determining
criminal responsibility has made any serious inroad on its supremacy. 6
The M'Naghten rule has been broadened in some jurisdictions to include
the irresistible impulse test 7 and in a few the irresistible impulse test replaces the right and wrong test." The most complete rejection of the
right and wrong criterion occurred in 1870, when the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, 9 sweeping aside both the M'Naghten and the irresistible
impulse tests, set forth a broad rule for determining legal insanity. 10 New
Hampshire stood alone until the decision in Durham v. United States was
handed down by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in 1954,11 admittedly following New Hampshire and repudiating both the
M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse tests. 12 The court formulated a
broad rule, similar to the New Hampshire rule, to be applied prospectively, saying that the test to be used in the Durham retrial and in all
future cases in the jurisdiction in which insanity shall be a defense is
"simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect".' 3 In the Lucas
case, the New Jersey court considered both the Durham and irresistible
4. Courts were asked to broaden the rule at least as early as 1846. Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
5. In the Lucas opinion, Judge Burling says, "It [the M'Naghten rule] has been
periodically attacked as unsound or archaic for six decades, but the New Jersey
courts have adhered to the rule." State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 66 (N.J. 1959) ; and
in Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 210, 150 A.2d 102, 108 (1959), the Pennsylvania court says, "The M'Naghten Case rule or 'the right and wrong test' has been
repeatedly reaffirmed by this court."
6. In some jurisdictions the rules have been incorporated into the statutes.
N. Y. PZNAL LAW § 1120; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 152 (1951).
7. "The irresistible impulse doctrine is applicable only to that class of cases
where the accused is able to understand the nature and consequences of his act
and knows it is wrong, but his mind has become so impaired by disease that he is
totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain his act." Thompson v.
Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 806, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952). See also, State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931) ; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873).
8. Generally, the first of the M'Naghten rules is eliminated, the second is left
in because if the accused does not know the difference betwen right and wrong
there is no need to apply the irresistible impulse test. The defendant "must be so
bereft of mind as to render him incapable of knowing right from wrong, or, if
knowing, incapable of controlling his actions." Sharp v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky.
765, 767, 215 S.W.2d 983, 984 (1948). See also, Korzak v. State, 202 Ark. 921, 154
S.W.2d 348 (1941); Commonwealth v. McCann, 325 Mass. 510, 91 N.E.2d 214
(1950).
9. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
10.The court held that no particular test of mental disease is a matter of law,
but that all symptoms and all tests of mental disease are purely matters of fact
to be determined by the jury. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
11. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
12. This decision brought forth a new flood of discussion and criticism of tests
for legal insanity. The University of Chicago Law Review presented a symposium
of nine articles entitled, Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Critique of Durham v.
United States, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1955). See also 45 COL. L. REv. 677 (1945) ;
54 COL. L. Rvv. 1153 (1954); 68 HARV. L. Rev. 364 (1954); 65 YALU L. J. 761

(1956).
13. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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impulse rules and concluded by strongly reaffirming its adherence to the
14
M'Naghten rule.
New Jersey is among the more recent jurisdictions which have refused
to follow Durham.15 At least nine other jurisdictions have rejected the
Durham rule within the last five years, reaffirming existing tests, 16 and
California courts have suggested that any proposed changes in the test
for criminal responsibility should be addressed to the legislature not to
the judiciary. 7 But the very bulk of material written by way of criticism
and discussion and the number of times courts have found it necessary
to review the right and wrong test before reaffirming, would seem to
indicate that courts, legal experts and medical experts alike have felt
that the inadequacies of existing rules need correction. Durham is obviously
not an answer, at least not an answer the courts will accept. The rule
that critics hailed as enabling psychiatrists to give expert testimony with-8
out being shackled by the archaic terminology of "right and wrong",'
the courts have found vague, undefined and incapable of application.' 9
The disagreement among modern schools of psychiatry has impressed
courts as resulting in uncertain and unreliable definitions of mental disease
leaving the jury with no guide for decision. 20 Justice Burling in the Lucas
opinion reiterates all of these criticisms.2 1 It is apparent that the courts
do not intend to reject rules which have proved durable and practical in
favor of no test at all. Therefore, the answer must be with M'Naghten
rather than without it. To be acceptable a test for determining criminal
responsibility must comply with traditional Anglo-American legal ethics
which dictate that persons able to make relatively free moral decisions be
responsible for their voluntary conduct. The judgment required of the
jury under the M'Naghten rule, whether the accused "knew" right from
wrong, reflects this attitude toward responsibility. A person knows, not
only through intellectual cognizance but through emotional experiences,
physical sensations, psychic reactions to group associations and adjustment to reality, as well. If defined in these terms, "know" comprehends
"understand", "realize", "experience", and other words appropriate to
the vocabularies of the experts and juries alike. With this construction
of the word "know", the psychiatrist when called upon as an expert witness, would be able to testify in the language of his profession, and com14. State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 68 (N.J. 1959).
15. Pennsylvania reaffirmed its adherence to the M'Naghten rule in March, 1959.
Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959).
16. In the Lucas opinion Judge Burling cites ten jurisdictions as having recently
rejected Durham. Some of these, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts and Michigan
follow the irresistible impulse test. State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 67 (1959).
17. People v. Berry, 44 Cal.2d 426, 282 P.2d 861 (1955); People v. Ryan,
140 Cal. App.2d 412, 295 P.2d 496 (1956).
18. 22 U. CHI. L. Rev. 325 (1954).
19. Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959).
20. State v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1958); State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12,
132 A.2d 623 (1957) ; State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957).
21. State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 67, 68, 69 (N.J. 1959).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959

11

FALL

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 6

19591

RECENT DECISIONS

municate to the laymen on the jury information they can use to make
their determination on the sanity issue. The jury can use the psychiatrist's clinical data especially in deciding whether or not defendant knew
the nature and quality of his act. Beyond this, since the criminal law
recognizes distinctions other than guilty and not guilty, responsible or
not responsible, expert testimony can be utilized in mitigation or sentence.
Modifying or revising the M'Naghten rule to admit such interpretation
would leave the courts with a test which utilizes expert testimony in words
meaningful to laymen, satisfies its requirements for definiteness and retains the requirement of rationality.
Catherine M. McEntee

CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA OF GUILTY TO MURDER-ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IF COURT FAILS TO INVESTIGATE THOROUGHLY
DEFENDANT'S

BACKGROUND

BEFORE

IMPOSING

DEATH PENALTY.

Commonwealth v. Green (Pa. 1959).
Three fifteen year old boys, one of whom was the defendant-appellant
Green, entered a drug store with the intent to commit a robbery. The
seventy-five year old druggist noticed Green at the rear of the fountain
and ordered him to get from behind the fountain, whereupon Green shot
and killed him. When apprehended, the youths confessed and a plea of
guilty to murder generally was entered by counsel for the three defendants. The trial court heard testimony to determine the degree of guilt
and found all three defendants guilty of murder in the first-degree. To
determine the appropriate penalty the court then heard testimony as to
any mitigating circumstances, after which the court fixed the penalty for
Green at death by electrocution and at life imprisonment for his two accomplices. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with Justice
Bell dissenting, remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
sentence Green to life imprisonment, and held that the trial court had
abused its discretion by imposing the death penalty where it had considered the criminal act but had not thoroughly investigated and considered
the criminal himself. Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d
241 (1959).'
Death was the mandatory penalty for first-degree murder in Pennsylvania prior to the Act of May 14, 1925,2 which created a statutory exception to the previously mandatory death penalty and vested in the trial
court the discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment when suffi1. Commonwealth v. Green, 369 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
2. Act of May 14, 1925, PA. LAWS 759.
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cient mitigating circumstances were present a Since the discretion of the
4
court in fixing the punishment must be exercised on some rational basis,
justice generally requires consideration of not merely the particular acts
by which the crime was committed, but also the character and propensities of the offender., Therefore, it is the duty of the trial court to consider any evidence of mitigating circumstances which may warrant sentence to life imprisonment instead of death.' While the trial court's determination of the penalty is subject to appellate review the question is
not whether the appellate court would have imposed the same penalty as
did the trial court but whether that court manifestly abused the discretion
confided to it by the statute.7 The supreme court is without authority
to modify the death penalty unless the trial court overlooked pertinent
facts or disregarded the force of evidence or erred in its law. 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated broadly that where
a murder is not the result of emotional impulse but occurred in the perpetration of a robbery, the sentence of death will not be modified, 9 because
considering the atrocity of this type of offense the death penalty is appropriate ' ° and not an abuse of discretion." In the only two prior instances
where the supreme court has reduced the death penalty to a sentence of
life imprisonment, 1 2 the murder was clearly a result of emotional impulse,
so that in the view of the supreme court the trial court was not justified
in imposing the death penalty.' 3 In the instant case the supreme court
3. See Commonwealth v. Hipple, 314 Pa. 76, 170 Atl. 258 (1934) for a discussion of that statute. The act provided that, in determining what penalty is appropriate the court should consider: (1) the facts of the crime; (2) the defendant's
background; and (3) the extent to which the defendant's mental responsibility is
diminished. That act was repealed by the Act of June 24, 1939, PA. LAws 872 §
1201, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5201 (Purdon), and replaced by a new statutory
provision, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1939), which continues to vest
the discretion in the trial court as to the fixing of punishment at life imprisonment
or death but did not reenact the above provision respecting what factors the trial
court should consider.
4. Commonwealth v. Spirellis, 32 Sch. 165 (Pa. C.P. 1931).
5. Commonwealth v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
6. The court should consider any and all available information, Kopp v. United
States, 55 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1932) ; including the general moral character of the
offender, his mentality, his habits, his social environment, his abnormal or sub-normal
tendencies, his age, his natural inclination or aversion to commit crime, the stimuli
which motivate his conduct, his past record, his family, his occupation, People v.
333, 180 N.E. 832 (1932) ; his good conduct both before and
McWilliams, 348 Ill.
after the offense, State v. Noble, 155 La. 843, 99 So. 619 (1924) ; as well as the
nature of the offense and the attending circumstances, Carter v. United States, 63
F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1933).
7. Commonwealth v. Gossard, 383 Pa. 239, 117 A.2d 902 (1955).
8. Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 196 Atl. 5 (1938).
9. Commonwealth v. Sterling, 314 Pa. 76, 170 Atl. 258 (1934).
10. Commonwealth v. Childers, 346 Pa. 258, 29 A.2d 471 (1943).
11. Commonwealth v. Hipple, 314 Pa. 76, 170 Atl. 258 (1934).
12. See Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 146, 151 A.2d 241, 245 (1959).
13. See Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932) in which
an industrious man without prior criminal record shot and killed a neighbor under
provocation of learning that his 18 year old son had been assaulted by deceased. In
Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941), an emotionally distraught
woman asphyxiated her illegitimate child under such circumstances that the death
penalty was clearly unwarranted.
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took the position that the duty falls upon the trial court to conduct a
thorough, complete, and exhaustive examination into the background of
the convicted criminal because the death penalty can be imposed only
when it is the sole penalty justified by both the criminal act and the
criminal himself.
The instant case appears to change drastically the criminal law of
Pennsylvania to the extent that the statutory exception to the once mandatory penalty of death has, in effect, "swallowed the rule." 14 Hereafter,
life imprisonment must be given except where the trial court conducts
an exhaustive investigation, the results of which justify no other penalty
but death. Since the supreme court now places the duty of inquiry into
mitigating circumstances upon the court, rather than defense counsel,
such investigation must apparently be conducted at public expense. 15
The abuse of discretion found here was the failure to gather sufficient
facts upon which to exercise sound judicial discretion, rather than a failure
to weigh properly a factor such as emotional impulse. Therefore, in the
instant case it seems to be an unjustifiable usurpation of the discretion
vested by statute in the trial court to have modified the sentence rather
than to remand the case for further investigation. 16 Perhaps this can be
explained by the sympathy displayed in the opinion for this youthful
offender and the fact that no person under the age of sixteen years and
only one person under the age of nineteen years has ever suffered the
7
death penalty in Pennsylvania.'
Michael D. Battaglini
14. The Act of 1925 did not contemplate an independent inquiry as to evidence
in mitigation of the sentence, but did contemplate that the determination was to be
based solely on the evidence admissible on the issues made by the indictment and
the plea of the defendant. Mitigating circumstances in relief of the penalty could
be admitted in a proper case, but it was largely a matter in the discretion of the trial
judge. Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 160 At. 602 (1932).
15. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (1) which provides for a presentence report by
the probation department. A similar rule has recently been proposed in Philadelphia
County in the new Proposed Rules Of Criminal Procedure, submitted by The Philadelphia Bar Association Committee on Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement, June 2,
1959, Rule 303(a) (2).
16. Where the abuse of discretion was that the death penalty was clearly unwarranted by the facts of the case on the record, no valid purpose would be served
by remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration since the supreme
court has already determined that life imprisonment is the only acceptable penalty
on the facts. However, where the supreme court finds that there was error in the
manner in which the penalty was arrived at by the trial court, it would appear
that remanding the case for further investigation and possible resentencing would
cure the error without usurping the discretion of the trial court. This was the procedure recommended by Mr. Justice Bell in his dissent in the instant case. See
Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 155, 151 A.2d 241, 250 (1959).
It is interesting to note that in Commonwealth v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d
259 (1959), decided the same day as the instant case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the trial court had misapplied certain evidence in reaching its conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed. The death sentence was vacated but the
case was remitted to the trial court for resentencing of the defendant.
17. See Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 147, 151 A.2d 241, 246 (1959).
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INSURANCE-VARIABLE ANNUITIES-NOT EXEMPT AS INSURANCE
FROM REGULATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND

THE INVESTMENT

COMPANY

ACT

OF

1940.

S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (U.S. 1959)
An injunction was sought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) restraining defendant insurance company (VALIC) from
selling variable annuity policies' unless and until those policies were registered with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933,2 and VALIC complied with the Investment Company Act of 1940.1 VALIC, a life insurance company incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia,
sells only variable annuity policies and is regulated by the Insurance
Superintendent of the District of Columbia and similar officials in the
other states in which it has qualified to do business. 4 The district court
dismissed the complaint under the provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson
Insurance Regulation Act 5 which provides that no act of Congress shall
be interpreted in a manner which "invalidates, supersedes, or impairs"
any state law regulating insurance unless the federal act expressly refers
to insurance. 6 In affirming, the court of appeals held that the determination
of a state insurance commissioner that a certain business is within his
scope of authority is conclusive as to whether that business comes within
the provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as insurance. 7 On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court, with four Justices dissenting, reversed
holding: that variable annuities are subject to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 since they are securities as defined in that act,8 and
are not annuities or insurance so as to be exempted from that act ;9 that
VALIC must comply with the provisions of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 since it is an investment company as defined in that act, 10 and
1. See note 14 infra for a brief explanation of variable annuity contracts.
2. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1952). This requires issuers of
securities to file registration statements and prospectuses with the SEC containing
information regarding the issuer and the security.
3. 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l-a-52. This requires investment companies to register with the SEC for purposes of disclosure and also restricts the
form of capital structure they may have and their investment operations.
4. Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Since the trial VALIc has qualified
to do business in Alabama and New Mexico.
5. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
6. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957).
7. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See
also 4 VILL. L. REv. 147 (1958).
8. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1952) : "The term security
means any note, stock . . . bond, . . . evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest
in any profit sharing agreement, . . . , investment contract . . . ."

9. 48 STAT. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1952): "(a) Except as
hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to
any of the following classes of securities: .. . (8) Any insurance ... policy or annuity
contract subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner . . .or officer performing like functions, of any state ....
10. 54 STAT. 797, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1952) : "[I]nvestment company
means any issuer which - (1) is . . . engaged primarily . . . in the business of in-
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is not an exempt insurance company as defined in that act;11 and that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to variable annuities since
they are not annuities or insurance. 12 S.E.C .v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).13
In both conventional and variable annuity contracts the annuitant
pays a premium in either a lump sum or in fixed installments, and in return receives periodic payments (annuities), beginning when he reaches
a certain age and continuing until his death. They differ in that in a conventional annuity the company obligates itself to pay a fixed amount in
each annuity, whereas in the variable annuity policy the amount of each
payment will vary. This is because the conventional annuity company
invests in bonds and mortgages, securities with a relatively fixed value in
terms of both principal and income, while the variable annuity company
invests in common stocks which have greater fluctuation in both principal
and income. Thus, the variable annuity is designed as a safeguard against
inflation on the theory that market prices of common stocks will rise as
the dollar depreciates. 14 In the instant case, the Court decided that a
variable annuity is neither an annuity nor insurance by stressing the fact
that a conventional annuity insures the annuitant against the risk of investment loss whereas the variable annuity does not. 15 Due to the recent
origins of the variable annuity there were few precedents on which to
base this decision. However, this case agrees with the Connecticut view
on the nature of variable annuities, 16 but is apparently contra to the position
taken by New York 17 and by the Internal Revenue Service.', There is
also authority for the general proposition that payments that are fixed
vesting, . . . ; (2) is engaged . . .in the business of issuing face-amount certificates
of the installment type. .. . : or (3) is engaged . ..in the business of investing, ...
owning ... or trading, in securities, and owns . . . securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets."
11. 54 STAT. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 provides that an insurance company
is not an investment company for purposes of the act. 54 STAT. 790 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2 defines insurance company as "a company . . . organized as an insurance
company, whose . . . predominant business . . . is . . . insurance . . . and which is
subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner of a State .. "
12. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1952) : "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance ... "
13. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 618 (1959).
14. A summary of a variable annuity company's operations is as follows: the
acquisition of a portfolio of common stocks and division of that portfolio into units
analogous to shares in a mutual fund; the crediting to the premium payer, at the
time of payments, of the number of units then equivalent in market value to the
amount of the premium; payment of annuities, the amount of units in each payment
being determined on an actuarial basis. (Actual payment is made in dollars equal
to the value of the units at the time of payment.) See generally Becker, Variable
Annuity Contracts: Insurance or Securities, 1958 INs. L. J. 612.
15. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 621 (1959).
16. Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346, 131 A.2d 834 (1957)
(Variable annuity not an annuity).
17. In re Supreme or Cosmopolitan Council of Brotherhood of Commonwealth,
193 Misc. 996, 86 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (Variable annuities are annuities).
18. Rev. Rul. 185, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 202. For Federal tax purposes a variable
annuity is an annuity.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol5/iss1/6

16

146

Editors: Recent Decisions
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

5

in terms of dollars are essential to an annuity, 19 but other courts seem to
require only that the amount of each payment be calculable at the time
of payment. 20 Without discussing at length the reasons for its decision,
the Court, in the instant case, held that "the term 'security' as defined
21
in the Securities Act is broad enough to include any annuity contract,
and the term 'investment company' as defined in the Investment Company
Act would embrace an insurance company." 22
According to the Court, the essence of insurance is the assuming of
risks by the insurer.23 Although both conventional and variable annuities
require the insurer to assume the risk that the annuitant will outlive his
life expectancy, variable annuities do not insure against the risk of investment loss while, according to the Court, conventional annuities do. Thus,
it would seem that the Court has held that a variable annuity is neither
an annuity nor insurance, because it does not insure against all that a
conventional annuity does. But in fact, the conventional annuity does not
insure against all investment losses, such as depreciation of the dollars
it has promised to pay, just as the variable annuity does not insure against
depreciation of the units in its portfolio of common stocks. The investment loss to the annuitant caused by inflation is just as real as any other
investment loss. In other words, the only essential difference between a
conventional and a variable annuity is that the former promises payment
in a commodity known as money forcing the annuitant to depend on the
value of the dollar for purchasing power, while the latter offers payment
in units of an equity portfolio forcing the annuitant to depend on the
value of those units for purchasing power. Therefore, the only real objection to characterizing variable annuities as annuities or insurance is the
fact that a company like VALIC does not have the same incentive to
follow a sound investment program that a conventional annuity company
would have, since no matter how poor its investments it could still meet
its obligations to the annuitants.2 4 This objection raises the question of
whether variable annuities should be regulated, not that of whether they
are within the provisions of the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act. Thus the Court has equated what the law is with what it
should be. On policy grounds the holding is defensible, but it may have
resulted in a precedent applicable to any new insurance policy.
Leslie J. Carson, Jr.
19. Booth v. Ammerman, 4 Bradf. 129 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1856).
20. See Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal. App. 2d 590, 78 P.2d 193 (1938).
21. See note 8 supra.
22. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. at 620. See note 10 supra.
23. S.E.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 79 Sup. Ct. at 622.
24. An annuity policy tied to the Consumer Price Index would probably eliminate this objection since it would provide a standard for measuring the amounts
paid annuitants independent of the success or failure of the annuity company's investments. This would be a real fixed annuity, fixed in terms of purchasing power
or real value.
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INTERNAL REVENUE-INCOME TAx-TAx BENEFIT
INAPPLICABLE TO FDIC CREDITS.

RULE

Philadelphia Saving Fund Soc'y v. United States (3d Cir. 1959).
Plaintiff, a mutual savings bank, paid an annual premium assessment
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1951 and 1952.1
In 1952 plaintiff received a credit, applicable to future assessments, from
the net assessment income of the FDIC for 1951.2 Plaintiff failed to
include the 1952 credit in its gross income for that year, although it did
deduct that year's assessment as a necessary operating expense. Pursuant
to the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue3 that the 1952
credit was subject to the federal income tax, the plaintiff paid the tax
on it but filed for a tax refund. The plaintiff bank, which was not subject
to the federal income tax in 1951, 4 argued that the credit was a refund
of its 1951 assessment, for which it had received no tax benefit as a deductible business expense and, therefore, the credit came under the tax
benefit rule. The court rejected this theory by deciding that the credit
was not a refund of the prior year's assessment and that, therefore, the
tax benefit rule was inapplicable. Philadelphia Saving Fund Soc'y v.
United States, 269 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1959). 5
The tax benefit rule provides for the exclusion from gross income of all
or any part of a recovery of a loss or expenditure for which no tax benefit
was received in the year in which the loss or expenditures occurred; i.e., the
deduction, if taken, did not reduce the taxpayer's tax. 6 Although this
rule was rejected when first proposed in a hearing before the Board of
Tax Appeals (BTA) in 1932, 7 the Treasury Department, in subsequent
rulings, recognized the tax benefit principle as applied to bad debts and
tax recoveries." An attempt by the BTA to extend the rule laid down
1. 64 STAT. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a) (1957) provides that the banks
whose deposits are insured will pay an annual premium equal to one-twelfth of one
per cent of their deposit liability.
2. 64 STAT. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(d) (1957) provides that the "net
assessment income" of the FDIC will be sixty percent of the difference between the
total assessments paid to the FDIC by the insured banks and the operating expenses
of the FDIC in that year.
3. Rev. Rul. 62, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 71.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(2) repealed by Rev. Act of 1951, ch, 521,
65 STAT. 452.

5. Philadelphia Sav. Fund Soc'y v. United States, 269
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b) (1)-(2), 53
COD4 OF 1954 § 101).
7. Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 TAX
8. I.T. 3391, 1940-2 CuM. BULL. 68; I.T. 3488, 1940-2

F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1959).
STAT. 1 (now INT. RZv.

L. Rtv. 329 (1947-1948).
CUM. BULL. 82; G.C.M.
22163, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 76; I.T. 3278, 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 76; I.T. 3256, 1939-1
CuM. BULL. 172; G.C.M. 20854, 1931-1 CuM. BULL. 102; I.T. 3172, 1938-1 CuM.
BULL. 150; G.C.M. 18525, 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 80.
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by the Treasury Department was opposed by the federal courts when
the cases came up on review, 9 and the resulting conflict led Congress to
enact the tax benefit rule into law, in so far as applicable to the recovery
of bad debts and taxes.10 However, the Supreme Court permitted the
tax benefit rule to be extended to recoveries other than those mentioned
in the statute by holding in Dobson v. Commissioner" that there was no
tax regulation compelling the tax court to find the results of a transaction
to be income if no economic gain had resulted. 12 Thereupon, the Treasury
Department further expanded the tax benefit rule to include "all other
losses, expenditures, and accruals made the basis of deductions from gross
income for prior taxable years ....
,, 13 In the instant case the plaintiff
sought to bring the credit within the tax benefit rule by claiming that
the credit was a return of part of the 1951 assessment and that as such
a return, it constituted no economic gain or tax advantage1 4 and therefore,
could not be income. The court of appeals held, however, that the appellant failed to show that the district court "clearly erred" when it ruled
that the credit was not a recovery of a particular assessment and that the
status of an insured bank was an advantage retained by appellant from
the transaction. 15
The court in its opinion in the instant case does not deal with the
tax benefit question because that issue could not have arisen unless the
credit was found to be a return of the 1951 assessment. The court determined that it was not such a return, basing its decision on the fact
that neither the legislative history nor the phraseology of the act compelled such a conclusion. ' This decision is in accord with the view expressed in debate by Congressman Brown of Georgia, a member of the
House sub-committee which drafted the bill, 17 and with the language used
9. Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. Rzv., 133 (1943).
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b), 53 STAT. 1 (now INT. Riv. COD oF
1954 § 101).
11. 320 U.S. 489 (1943). The Court here said that although it did not adopt
the tax benefit rule, there existed no tax regulation which compelled the tax court
to find the results of a transaction taxable income if no economic gain had resulted.
12. Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 TAX L. Rv. 329, 330 (19471948).
13. T.D. 5454, 1945 Cum. BULL. 10.
14. To support his position the plaintiff relies on the rule of the Dobson case,
supra note 11, and Bartlett v. Delaney, 75 F. Supp. 490 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd 173
F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 817 (1949) as cited by Biggs, C.J.
in his dissent. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. United States, supra note 5. The
Dobson case is concerned with the deduction of a loss sustained on securities, and the
Bartlett case deals with the recovery of interest on an illegally paid tax.
15. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. United States, supra note 5. The district
court's opinion is reported at 167 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
16. Ibid. The court cites the authority upon which the appellant relied to argue
that the credit was a return of a prior assessment.
17. 96 CONG. R~c. 10654 (1950).
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in the House report on the bill,' 8 as well as the language of the bill itself.1 9
The Commissioner reached the same result in 1955 when he ruled that
FDIC credits were a part of gross income.20 An opposite conclusion was
reached in the dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Biggs who assumed
that the credit was a recovery of part of the taxpayer's 1951 assessment
and argued that, as such a recovery, it was analogous to a payment of
returns from a mutual insurance company to a policy holder and, consequently, should come under the tax benefit rule.21 Although it would be
unjust to tax a refund of an expenditure from which the taxpayer retained
no advantage22 or from which no economic gain resulted,2 3 the status of
an insured bank was certainly an economic advantage to plaintiff. 2 4 Moreover, the cases cited by plaintiff to sustain its position that the recovery
should come under the tax benefit rule were all instances where the taxpayer retained a reversionary or residuary interest in the expenditure so
as to be able to characterize the recovery as a return of capital. 25 Since
by statute the FDIC can distribute its net assessment income only if
operating expenses do not exceed sixty per cent of its total assessments, 26
it would seem that the credits given to member banks are more in the
nature of dividends than a return of capital. However, the instant case
leaves open the question of whether the tax benefit rule should be applied
to the recovery of an expenditure which occurred in a prior non-taxable
year. It might be argued that since the Commissioner, in expanding the
tax benefit rule, specifically enlarged it as applied to expenditures made
in prior taxable years,2 7 he meant to exclude expenditures made in nontaxable years. On the other hand, it would not be unreasonable to apply
the tax benefit rule to prior non-taxable years, in the light of its previous
application to returns of losses or expenditures which had never been
18. H. R. Rep. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
19. 64 STATi. 873 (1950) 12 U.S.C. § 1817(d) (1957). By referring to the credit
as issuing from the FDIC's net assessment income, the legislature indicated that
although the distribution of the credit is to be determined pro-rata in proportion to
the prior year's assessment, it is still the distribution of an asset which belong solely
to the FDIC and in which the plaintiff retains no legal or equitable interest.
20. Rev. Rul. 478, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 18.
21. Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. United States, 269 F.2d 853, 856 (3d Cir.
1959).
22. Bartlett v. Delaney, 75 F. Supp. 490, 493 (D. Mass. 1948).
23. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
24. It might be argued that the credit is analogous to a dividend declared by
mutual insurance companies, which dividends are really returns of overpayments of
premiums. Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6, Philadelphia Say. Fund Soc'y v. United
States, supra note 5, citing the dictum in Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S.
523 (1920) ; Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Herold, 198 Fed. 199 (3d Cir. 1912),
aff'd per curiam, 201 Fed. 918 (3d Cir. 1913). Like such dividends it is argued,
the credits, being overpayments, would not be taxable.
25. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) ; Wichita State Bank and
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Perry v. United States,
160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
26. 64 STAT. 873, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(d)
27. T.D. 5454, 1945 Cum. BULL. 10.
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deducted to reduce gross income, even though they could have been deducted. 28 However, the fact that the credit was adjudged not to be a
return of a specific expenditure and the fact that an economic advantage
was retained, viz., the status of an insured bank, rule against the possibility
29
of enlarging the tax benefit rule to encompass the instant case.
Robert E. Slota

LABOR LAW-PRE-EMPTION OF JURISDICTION-FAILURE OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD To ASSERT JURISDICTION
OVER PEACEFUL

PICKETING.

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon (U.S. 1959)
Plaintiff union sought an agreement from respondents to employ
only those workers who were presently members of the union or who
would apply for union membership within thirty days of a union shop
agreement. The respondents refused on the grounds that no employee
had expressed a desire to join the union and, that no contract could be
negotiated until the employees had designated a union as their collective
bargaining agent.' When the union began peacefully to picket the respondents' place of business, the Superior Court of the County of San
Diego enjoined such conduct and awarded the respofidents one thousand
dollars damages. Simultaneously with the state court action, respondents
filed proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board, but the
Board declined jurisdiction. 2 The Supreme Court of California affirmed
the decision holding that since the NLRB had declined jurisdiction, the
state courts had jurisdiction over the dispute and, further, that the conduct involved was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the
4
3
National Labor Relations Act and not privileged under California law.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
decision holding that the refusal of the NLRB to assert jurisdiction did
28. SeeCommissioner v. United States & Int'l Sec. Corp., 130 F.2d 894 (1942)
(dictum).
29. See generally, Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAX
L. Rev. 381 (1955) ; 1959 DUKE L. J. 151, Taxation of Refunded Amounts Deducted
in Prior Years; 29 TEXAs L. Rgv. 966 (1951), for another perspective on the prob-

lem of the taxability of recovery of prior losses or payments, previously deducted.
1. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1947)
forbids an employer from attempting to discriminate against an employee by encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor union; 49 STAT. 453 (1935),
as amended, 61 STAT. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1947) prescribes the manner in which
collective bargaining agents shall be designated.
2. Jurisdiction was declined presumably because the Board's monetary standards
as to jurisdictional requirements were not fulfilled. See note 18 infra.
3. 49 STAT. 432 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1947).
4. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1
(1955).
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not leave to the states power over activities they would otherwise be preempted from regulating, but the issue of damages was remanded to determine if it could be sustained under California law.5 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court of California sustained the award of damages, 6 holding
that the union's activity constituted a tort under state law as an unfair
labor practice. 7 Again on certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision holding that where an activity is arguably protected
by Section 7 or prohibited by Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act and the
NLRB has not adjudicated the status of such conduct, then the states
do not have the power to control such activity by an award of damages.8
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 9
Since the NLRA, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, was enacted
pursuant to the power of Congress, under the commerce clause, 10 to protect interstate commerce from interruption or harassment by labor-management disputes," the jurisdiction of the NLRB extends to all unfair labor
practices "affecting commerce".1 2 It is evident both from the wording
of the statute 13 and its legislative history 1 4 that Congress sought to delegate to the NLRB the widest scope of possible jurisdiction.'5 Congress'
intent has been implemented by the courts' which have uniformly held
that only the NLRB can determine whether an alleged unfair labor prac5. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
6. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473

(1958).

7. CAL. LABOR CODX §§ 923, 1115-18.
8. Congress in the Labor Management Relations Act, known as the Taft-Hartley
Act, enumerated certain activity which is to be protected under § 7, as the right
of employees to self-organization, collective bargaining and the like. It also prescribed under § 8 what would constitute unfair labor practices for employees and
also unfair labor practices for a labor organization or its agents.
9. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
10. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; . . . To make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ..
"
11. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §151 (1952).
12. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952).
13. 61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1952) : "The term affecting commerce means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow
of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
14. Walsh, NLRB, S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935): "While
the bill of course does not intend to go beyond the commerce power of Congress,
as that power may be marked out by the Courts, it seeks the full limit of that power."
15. The basis of pre-emption by the Federal Government is found in U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI: "This constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and
the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
16. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944). In NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939), the court said the operation of the act does not "depend
on any particular volume of commerce affected more than that to which the courts
would apply the maxim de minimis." NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F.2d
829 (3d Cir. 1941).
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tice is within the scope of the act.1 7 As a result of this definition of the
Board's powers and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that neither
state courts nor state agencies may enjoin an unfair labor practice within
the scope of the act when the Board has not ceded jurisdiction to a state
agency as provided within the act,18 or when the Board has declined to
assert its jurisdiction because the amount of interstate commerce19 in20
volved does not meet the prescribed minimum monetary standards.
Although it is well settled that, under their police powers, states have
full authority by use of injunctions, damage suits or criminal prosecutions
to deal with instances of violence or threats of violence, mass picketing
and coercion, even where such conduct is within the scope of the TaftHartley Act,21 the question remains whether state courts can award damages for losses sustained as the result of unfair labor practices not in22
volving violence or threats of violence. In International Union v. Russell,
the Supreme Court upheld an award of damages by a state court against
a union which had deprived a member of work by illegally discharging
him from the union. Similarly, the Court, in United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum,23 upheld an award of damages in a tort action by a state court,
although the conduct constituting the tort was also an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act. The instant case distinguishes the
Russell and Laburnum cases by noting that in both these instances the
17. Weber v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) ; Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union,
167 F.2d 183 (1948).
18. STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952). This section provides that
when the Board declines to act, it may cede disputes to state agencies having similar
labor laws and policies as those expressed in federal enactments. There is no record
of this power being used.
19. The Board, through case law and promulgated rules, has exercised a discretionary power by refusing to accept jurisdiction in cases arising in industries
doing less than a certain dollar volume of business. 5 CCH LAB.L. Rim. (4th Ed.)
50,086, 50,092 (1958). The Board's discretionary jurisdiction has been upheld without limiting its possible area of activity. Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d

418 (9th Cir. 1951).

20. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) wherein a state
board was ousted of jurisdiction though the Board refused to assert its jurisdictional
powers. See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20
(1957), wherein the state court could not act though the Board refused to assert
its jurisdiction. In both instances the Court made reference to the conflict of remedies
naturally resulting if both the states and the federal government could enjoin the
same activity.
21. United Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266
(1956) ; Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942) ; Irving Subway Grating Co., Inc. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671
(E.D.N.Y. 1953).
22. 356 U.S. 634 (1958). In this case there was violence and mass picketing
but the court also noted that in this instance the Board could not have awarded
punitive damages and thus a clear conflict of remedies was not in issue.
23. 347 U.S. 656, 665 (1954). "To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor practices, that case [Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485 (1953)] recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to
the same end. To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure
for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is
no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious
conduct have been eliminated".
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activity regulated was within the jurisdiction of the state because of its
power to prevent actual or threatened violence under its police powers.
In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,2 4 the Court noted that in the injunctive relief area, federal and state remedies would conflict and thus
federal pre-emption resulted. The instant case now extends federal preemption to include damage actions though no provision has been made
by Congress in any labor legislation for a recovery of damages for losses
sustained in labor disputes. The Court views a damage action as a restraint on activity, similar to an injunction, rather than mere compensation for an actual loss.
The NLRB alleged that there was a limit to the number of cases
it could adequately handle and thus, the dollar volume jurisdiction rule
was promulgated. This, of course, excluded many small enterprises from
the coverage of the Taft-Hartley Act. When the Supreme Court in the
Guss case and in the instant decision precluded the parties from seeking
relief from state courts or agencies, a "no man's land" was created which
was not under the jurisdiction of the state courts or the NLRB. To meet
this problem, Congress amended the Labor Management Relations Act,
to eliminate this "no man's land". The amendment explicitly sanctions
the policy of the NLRB of refusing to accept jurisdiction of labor disputes
where such disputes do not have a substantial effect on commerce. 25 However, the. dollar volume jurisdiction rule promulgated by the Board as
of August 1, 1959 may not be changed to exclude disputes now within
the Board's jurisdiction. 26 Furthermore, it is provided that no provision
of the act shall prevent a state court or agency "from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction." 27 Thus,
the Taft-Hartley Act as now amended codifies the practice of the Board but
at the same time eliminates the effect of federal pre-emption in the "no
man's land". However, it should be recognized that the solution of this
problem only raises a two-fold problem in its place. First, it is clear
that provisions of state law may differ not only with other states but
also with the federal enactments, thus resulting in conflicting decisions
among the state courts. Secondly, many states have no labor laws under
which appropriate relief can be granted in every case. Thus, in certain
limited areas the "no man's land" will continue to exist.
John F. McElvenny
24.
25.
26.
27.

See note 19 supra.
Pub. L. No. 257, 86th Cong., lst Sess. § 701(c) (1) (Sept. 14, 1959).
Ibid.
Pub. L. No. 257, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(c) (2) (Sept. 14, 1959).
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WIFE'S RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.

King v. Greene (N.J. 1959).
Plaintiff's interest in a tenancy by the entirety was levied upon and
sold at sheriff's sale to A, who later joined with plaintiff's husband in a
conveyance of all their interest in the properties to B. B later conveyed
to defendants, plaintiff's husband having died in the meantime. Plaintiff
instituted an action for possession, contending that, as surviving spouse,
she is the sole owner of the property and that the sheriff's deed conveyed
only one-half of the rents, issues and profits of the property during the
joint lives of both spouses but did not convey her right of survivorship.
The trial court found for plaintiff but on appeal the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, with two justices dissenting, reversed and held that a wife's
right of survivorship can be levied and executed on for her separate debts.
King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1959).1
An estate by the entirety is, in effect, a joint tenancy between husband and wife, with a right of survivorship protected against the unilateral action of the other spouse. The common law rule was that a conveyance to a husband and wife created a tenancy by the entirety unless
some other form of estate was specified. 2 Under the common law a
creditor of the husband might levy and sell on execution his interest in
an estate by the entirety, and a purchaser at such a sale would acquire
the right to immediate possession of the whole estate and title subject
only to the wife's right of survivorship ;3 but the creditors of the wife
could not levy upon her interest.4 Although some courts are divided as
to the effect which married women's property acts, 5 allowing married

women to hold property in their own right, have had on tenancies by the
entirety,6 three general approaches are discernable. Some courts have
held that estates by the entirety still exist but are so modified by these
acts so as to put the spouses on an equal footing in regard to their rights,
1. King v. Greene, 153 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1959).
2. In re Brown, 60 F.2d 269 (W.D. Ky. 1932); Simon's Estate, 4 Clark 204
(Pa. 1847).

v. Cheros, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927); Pray v. Stebbins, 14
N.E. 613 (1886). The Massachusetts rule is that modern legislation
property rights of married women does not apply to tenancy by the
therefore, the common law rule on tenancy by the entirety is still in
state. See note 9 infra.
v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929).
5. The New Jersey statute, N. J. Rev. STAT. § 37:2-12 (1937), provides:
"The real and personal property of a woman which she owns at the time
of her marriage, and the real and personal property, and rents, issues, and
profits thereof, of a married woman, which she receives or obtains in any manner
whatever after her marriage, shall be her separate property as if she were a
feme sole."
6. For an exhaustive, state by state compilation of modern rules on tenancy by
the entirety and the effect of married women's property acts on said estates see,
Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Ttemp. L. Q. 24 (1951).
3. Raptes
Mass. 219, 4
in regard to
entirety, and
effect in that
4. Licker
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privileges and immunities. 7 A second approach is to view such legislation
as abolishing estates by the entirety altogether.8 Finally, other courts declare that the acts do not apply to the estate and therefore, estates by
the entirety exist as at common law. 9 The instant case is the first decision in New Jersey dealing with the effect of the Married Women's
11
Property Act' 0 on the alienability of the wife's right of survivorship.
2
However, it overrules two cases at the trial level' by allowing the wife's
right of survivorship to be alienated for her separate debts. 13 The court
proceeds on the theory that the Married Women's Property Act gives
the wife all the rights that the husband had in an estate by the entirety
under the common law. 14 Therefore, if at common law the husband can
alienate his right of survivorship, the wife,5 by virtue of the property act
can now alienate her right of survivorship.'
The legal concept of the estate by the entirety was developed in a
completely different social milieu and in consequence of certain ideas then
dominant, namely, that a married woman had no separate legal existence
of her own.' 6 Thus, this fictional unity of the husband and wife was the
basis of the estate by the entirety, since the wife, having no legal existence of her own, could not hold property in her own right.' 7 This fictional
basis for the estate is completely repudiated by the married women's
property acts, which allow a woman to hold property in her own right
as would a feme sole.' 8 As a result, some states have concluded that these
acts have thereby destroyed the estate by the entirety19 without exploring
the possible social advantage of maintaining such an estate even in a
modified form. When weighing the relative value and utility of these
7. Ibid. In New Jersey the effect of the Married Women's Property Act is to

create, in effect, an estate in common between the spouses with right of survivorship
existing as at common law. Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651, 9 At. 695 (1887).
8. Ibid.
9. Raptes v. Cheros, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927); Pray v. Stebbins, 14
Mass. 219, 4 N.E. 613 (1886); see Phipps, supra note 7.
10. See supra note 5.
11. For dictum supporting the holding in the instant case see Taub v. Shampanier,
95 N.J.L. 349, 112 At. 322 (1921) ; Fruzynski v. Radler, 23 N.J. Super. 274, 93
A.2d 35 (1952) ; Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169, 67 Ati. 828 (1907) ; Buttlar
v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651, 9 Atl. 695 (1887).
12. Dworan v. Miloszewski, 17 N.J. Super, 269, 85 A.2d 550 (1952); Zanzonico
v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46 A.2d 565 (1946).
13. King v. Greene, 153 A.2d at 60.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 84 N.W. 92 (1900).
17. Gill v. McKinney, 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S.W. 416 (1918).
18. "But the universal tendency of modern legislation has been to abrogate this
theoretical unity of husband and wife, to recognize and maintain the legal identity
of the wife, and to secure to her a distinct and separate right to the acquisition and
enjoyment of property.
* * . The rule of the common law creating estates by entirety is irreconcilable
with both the letter and the spirit of the statutes [married women's property acts].
. . ." Appeal of Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 33 AtI. 652, 653-54 (1895). Accord, Mittel v.
Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N.E. 553 (1890); Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 84 N.W.
92 (1900); Gill v. McKinney, 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S.W. 416 (1918).
19. Ibid. See also Phipps, supra note 7 at 29.
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estates courts should bear in mind two separate and often conflicting interests. On the one hand, the just claims of creditors of the separate
spouses should be protected ;20 but on the other hand, there is the social
desirability of protecting family security by depriving an improvident
spouse of the opportunity of dissipating the family's entire wealth.2 1 A
fair balance could be obtained by limiting the peculiar incidents of the
estate by the entirety in either of two respects; namely, by either confining the restriction on alienation to property actually occupied as a home,
or by allowing this restriction on alienation only to protect the non-debtor
22
spouse's right of survivorship.
Joseph G. Manta

WILLS-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-ENFORCEMENT OF ORAL AGREEMENT
MAKE MUTUAL WILLS.

To

Oursler v. Armstrong (N.Y. App. Div. 1959)
Decedent and his wife simultaneously executed wills with reciprocal
dispositions, whereby decedent's residual estate would go to his present
wife, unless she predeceased him, in which case it would be divided evenly
among his four children, two by a previous marriage and two by his present wife. The wife's will provided that her residual estate should go to
decedent but if she survived him the property willed to her by decedent
would go to his four children. Decedent's wife survived him and after
his death made a new will leaving her entire estate to her own two children by decedent and nothing to the children of his previous marriage.
When this later will was admitted to probate at her death, the children
of decedent's first marriage brought this action to establish a constructive
trust on, property which had passed to their stepmother under decedent's
will. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, with Justice
Frank dissenting, affirmed the decision of the supreme court imposing
a constructive trust on the wife's estate in favor of the plaintiffs. Oursler
v. Armstrong, 186 N.Y.S.2d 829 (App. Div. 1959). 1
20. Niles, Abolish Tenancy by the Entirety, 79 TRUST & ESTATES 366 (1944).
21. 2 AMERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY § 6.6 at 32 (1952).
22. Wilkerson, Creditor's Rights Against Tenants By The Entirety, 11 TENN.
L. Rzv. 134 (1932). An interesting problem, touched by one dissenting justice is
whether a purchaser at an execution sale of a debtor spouse's interest would have
the right of partition. King v. Greene, 153 A.2d at 60. A purchaser at a voluntary
sale has the right of partition. Schulz v. Zeigler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199, 83 Atd. 968 (1912).
It would seem that a purchaser at an involuntary sale should also have this right.
However, this can still in no way affect the non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship
to the whole estate.
1. Oursler v. Armstrong, 186 N.Y.S.2d 829 (App. Div. 1959).
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The mutual will agreement 2 and the secret trust3 are two situations
where courts have been called upon to enforce agreements to make specific
testamentary dispositions. The former are wills executed pursuant to an
agreement to dispose of property in a particular manner made in consideration of each other, which, although they remain revocable during
4
the joint lives of the makers, become irrevocable on the death of either.
A secret trust is created where a testator is induced to make or not to
change a will by a legatee's promise that he will devote his legacy to a
certain lawful purpose. 5 Although in most jurisdictions these agreements
are not found to be within the statute of frauds and may be specifically
enforced even when proved by parol, 6 in New York there are statutory
requirements that not only a contract to make a testamentary disposition
or to bequeath property 7 but also one to establish a trust s must be in
writing. Consequently, when these agreements are merely expressed orally,
the New York courts enforce them through a constructive trust which
is a device used by equity to impose a trust to prevent unjust enrichment,
irrespective of the express or implied intent of the parties.9 It is sufficient
for the creation of the constructive trust that property innocently acquired
is fraudulently retained by one who enjoys a relationship of confidence
with the grantor, 10 and since it arises by operation of law, the constructive
trust is specifically exempted from the operation of the statute of frauds."
In the instant case, without terming the arrangement either a secret trust
or an agreement for mutual wills, the court found that decedent's wife
took property under decedent's will with an implicit understanding beween
them that a distribution to the four children was an obligation. The majority relied on the relationship of confidence created by the nuptial union,
coupled with statements by the wife that she wanted to dispose of property left her by decedent "as he would do it himself" to impose a con2
structive trust in favor of the plaintiffs.'
In holding that evidence sufficient to prove a binding agreement to
make a will prior to the amendment of the statute of frauds is now
sufficient to establish a constructive trust, the instant case follows a line
3
of New York cases dealing with the purchase money resulting trust.'
2. Edson v. Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 50 N.E. 265 (1898).
3. Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 45 N.E. 876 (1897).
4. O'Hara v. Dudley, 95 N.Y. 403 (1884).
5. Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 45 N.E. 876 (1897).
6. Jannetta v. Jannetta, 205 Minn. 266, 285 N.W. 619 (1939) ; Tooker v. Vreelend, 92 N.J. Eq. 346, 112 Ati. 665 (1921); Turner v. Theiss, 124 W. Va. 23, 38
S.E.2d 369 (1946).
7. N. Y. PtRS. PROP. LAW § 31; N. Y. R4AL PROP. LAW § 259a.
8. N. Y. REAIL PROP. LAW § 242.
9. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378 (1919)
In re Cohen's Estate, 137 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
10. Cavallaro v. Lewis, 98 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
11. Supra note 8.
12. Oursler v. Armstrong, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
13. Pattison v. Pattison, 301 N.Y. 65, 92 N.E.2d 890 (1950); Natelson v.
A. B. L. Holding Co., 260 N.Y. 233, 183 N.E. 373 (1932); Foreman v. Foreman.
251 N.Y. 237, 167 N.E. 428 (1929).
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In the principal New York case on that subject, Foreman v. Foreman,14
a constructive trust was imposed on land by the court relying on a relationship of trust and confidence existing between a payor husband and
grantee wife, thereby accomplishing the same result as that reached by
other jurisdictions by use of the resulting trust. The constructive trust
is traditionally based on fraud, duress, or undue influence' 5 but in these
cases where oral agreements are involved the courts in New York grasp
the fact that the agreement is made between persons in a relationship of
confidence and utilizes the subsequent breach thereof to supply the requisite
fraud. This appears to be strained reasoning at best and, in the case of
agreements to make wills, of questionable desirability. In the case of
Hamlin v. Stevens,16 the court, in discussing contracts to make testamentary
dispositions, stated:
"Such contracts are easily fabricated and hard to disprove because
the sole contracting party on one side is always dead when the question arises. .

.

. We wish . . . to protect the community from the

spoilation of dead men's estates by proof of such contracts through
parol evidence given by interested witnesses."
The fears expressed by the court in the Hamlin case were apparently
shared by the state legislature when such agreements to make testamentary
dispositions were expressly brought within the statute of frauds 17 thirty
years later. With this in mind one might well question the propriety of
the court in effectively nullifying this statute.
Norman J. Shachoy
14. Supra note 13.
15. RxSTATVMZNT, RtSTITUTION § 184 (1937).
16. 177 N.Y. 39, 47, 48, 69 N.E. 118, 120, 121 (1903).
17. N. Y. PSRS. PROP. LAW § 31.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959

29

